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SOCRATES' ASPASIAN ORATION: THE PLAY OF PHILOSOPHY AND 
POLITICS IN PLATO'S MENEXENUS 
STEPHEN G. SALKEVER Bryn Mawr College 
P lato's Menexenus is overlooked, perhaps because of the difficulty of gauging its irony. In it, 
Socrates recites a funeral oration he says he learned from Aspasia, describing events that 
occurred after the deaths of both Socrates and Pericles' mistress. But the dialogue's ironic 
complexity is one reason it is a central part of Plato's political philosophy. In both style and substance, 
Menexenus rejects the heroic account of Athenian democracy proposed by Thucydides' Pericles, 
separating Athenian citizenship from the quest for immortal glory; its picture of the relationship of 
philosopher to polis illustrates Plato's conception of the true politikos in the Statesman. In both 
dialogues, philosophic response to politics is neither direct rule nor apolitical withdrawal. Menexe- 
nus presents a Socrates who influences politics indirectly, by recasting Athenian history and thus 
transforming the terms in which its political alternatives are conceived. 
T he Menexenus is one of the Platonic dialogues 
least read by students of political theory. But 
there are good reasons, both thematic and 
stylistic, for us to consider the dialogue more care- 
fully than we have in the past. This is the dialogue in 
which Socrates recites to a young and admiring friend 
named Menexenus a political speech that he says he 
has learned from Pericles' mistress Aspasia, whom he 
describes as his, as well as Pericles', instructor in the 
art of oratory (235e3-7)-a funeral oration (epitaphios) 
for the Athenian war dead.' The dialogue can be 
divided into three parts: (1) an opening conversation 
between the two men (234a-36d); (2) the epitaphios 
proper (236d-49c), which is subdivided into three 
parts (a historical account of the people and the 
politeia (regime) of Athens, a narrative of Athenian 
war deeds from antiquity to the present, and an 
exhortation to present-day Athenians); and (3) a brief 
closing exchange between Socrates and his interloc- 
utor (249d-e). 
Aspasia, Socrates tells Menexenus, has "glued to- 
gether" the speech partly, as it seems to him, with 
"leftover" bits from her composition of the famous 
funeral oration delivered by Pericles (236bl-6).2 The 
Menexenus, then, presents itself as Plato's Socratic 
counterpart to the speech of Thucydides' Pericles. In 
both speeches we have an account of the deeds of the 
Athenian past combined with an account of the 
essential character of the Athenian politeia, both 
seemingly designed to throw light on how Athenians 
are to understand themselves and to act in the future. 
But the styles of the two discourses are not similar: 
Thucydides gives us the speech of a statesman he 
admires, a speech that could to all appearances have 
been delivered in Athens;3 while there can be little 
doubt that Socrates' Aspasian epitaphios and the brief 
exchanges with Menexenus that precede and follow it 
make up a comic commentary on the Athenian fu- 
neral oration, though in exactly what way and to 
what end we cannot be sure. 
In the Menexenus, then, Plato elaborates the contest 
he establishes in the Gorgias between Pericles and 
Socrates for the right to be called the true Athenian 
politikos (statesman). Moreover, the dialogue suggests 
the possibility of redeeming what in the Gorgias 
seems unredeemable:4 the practice of public oratory 
in democratic Athens. The funeral speech itself in 
places appears to be an alternative to Pericles' epi- 
taphios, rather than comic commentary on it, particu- 
larly in its characterization of the Athenian politeia as 
an aristocracy-by-popular-consent (238c7-d2), rather 
than a democracy, and its advice to both the fathers 
and the mothers of the war dead to turn their 
attention inward and concern themselves with their 
own virtue (247e5-48a7), rather than to fall in love 
with Athens. Thus, even though the long and de- 
tailed military history of Athens from the Persian War 
to the present that occupies over half of the epitaphios 
in the Menexenus (239dl-46a3) is chock-full of errors, 
omissions, and hyperbole and even though the dia- 
logue's opening and closing conversations are insis- 
tently playful and ironic, the speech also presents a 
picture of good Athenian citizenship that seems plau- 
sibly Platonic or Socratic.5 Socrates' recitation of 
Aspasia's patchwork epitaphios thus opens the possi- 
bility that there is an alternative to the rhetoric of 
flattery and the politics of collective pleonexia (un- 
bounded desire) condemned in the Gorgias. This is 
surely a question of the utmost seriousness; yet 
Plato's treatment of it here is playful and ironic.6 How 
can this be so? 
Commentators on the Menexenus have been 
sharply divided over the question of whether to read 
the dialogue as a serious epitaphios or as an ironical 
comment on Athenian politics in general and the 
institution of funeral orations in particular.7 Either 
way, a Platonic dialogue concerning epitaphioi must 
command our attention, since there is good reason to 
think that the institution of the public funeral oration 
had a special place in Athenian political oratory, as 
the occasion on which Athenians gathered not only 
to hear a eulogy on the war dead but to recall who 
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they were as Athenian citizens. Lincoln's Gettysburg 
Address is the closest American equivalent-both a 
eulogy and an exercise in collective self-definition. 
But Lincoln's speech was an unusual event, while the 
public funeral oration was a long-standing and cus- 
tomary practice in Athens.8 According to Nicole 
Loraux's (1986) detailed study of the epitaphios, its 
function was to provide the occasion on which Ath- 
ens was invented and reinvented in narrative form. 
Only a few such orations have come down to us; 
surely the most famous is Pericles' speech in Thucy- 
dides, which is the classic statement of the ethos of 
Athenian citizenship at the height of its fifth-century 
flowering. Two others, by Demosthenes and Hyper- 
ides, are from later in the fourth century; a speech 
written by Lysias appeared roughly 10 years earlier 
than the Menexenus, and there is a small fragment 
from an oration by Gorgias. Even though the number 
of examples is small, it is clear that the epitaphios was 
a distinct genre,9 with standard expectations about 
the ordering of topics and the contents of the mes- 
sage. In the Menexenus, Socrates follows the formal 
order of the epitaphios-a prelude identifying the 
speech as one required by Athenian nomos (law or 
custom), a praise of the dead heroes and of Athens, 
and a consolatory exhortation (paramuthia) to the 
living-but criticizes the message of other funeral 
orations and provides an alternative way of charac- 
terizing Athenian virtue. Thus, the dialogue appears 
to contain both a Socratic critique of Athenian self- 
understanding (along the lines set out in the attack on 
Pericles and traditional Athenian politics in the Gor- 
gias) and an alternative to that self-understanding. 
Here we have the philosopher speaking not to the 
city but to his city-and in a language and form the 
city understands considerably better than the lan- 
guage of Socratic dialogue and elenchos (refutation). 
The dialogue gives us the Platonic Socrates acting the 
role he claims for himself in the Gorgias: the one 
Athenian who truly practices genuine politiki (state- 
craft), the one artful politikos in Pericles' city. 
But any attempt to ascertain the meaning of the 
dialogue is radically unsettled by the density and 
variety of its irony-both Platonic and Socratic. This 
is, I think, the primary reason why the Menexenus has 
not been treated as a central work in the Platonic 
corpus. Part of the problem is the difficulty of decid- 
ing what it means to say that the dialogue is ironic. 
Most of those who see the Menexenus as ironic, rather 
than serious, characterize that irony either as a ram- 
bunctious parody on the model of Aristophanic com- 
edy, designed to deflate the arrogant pretension of 
Athenian political speech,'0 or as bitter satire in- 
tended to expose the hypocrisy and injustice of the 
democracy that murdered Socrates and scorned phi- 
losophy." But reference to one or the other of these 
genres-parody or satire-is not sufficient to account 
for the complex tone shifts of Socrates' playful speech 
or for the subtlety and essential ambiguity of Plato's 
written dialogue. Recognizing this, some commenta- 
tors urge that the core of the dialogue is seriously2 But 
the nature of Platonic and Socratic "seriousness" 
here, as with their "irony", requires more careful 
consideration than it has so far received. Those who 
deny that the dialogue is primarily ironic generally 
understand it to be promoting some particular pro- 
gram of reform for Athenian politics. But there is no 
clear political program or set of principles to be found 
in the dialogue-no systematic "theory" in the sense 
used by contemporary analytic philosophers. In or- 
der to make sense of the Menexenus, we must first 
reject the idea that the dialogue has to fall into one of 
two mutually exclusive genre categories: the comic or 
the serious. 
My alternative to the humorous/serious antithesis 
is to say that the dialogue is a playful comment on 
one of the most solemn moments of Athenian politics 
and that its commentary is not merely negative and 
dismissive but carries with it some opinions as to how 
to think about the possibilities and limits of demo- 
cratic politics. The playfulness of the commentary 
resides not in its failure to affirm any opinions about 
politics as true but in its refusal to accept any formu- 
lation of even the most dearly held opinions as final, 
as written in stone.'3 The Platonic and Socratic opin- 
ions playfully yet seriously asserted by the Menexenus 
involve several aspects of political life; but they 
always appear to oppose views expressed or implied 
by Thucydides and by his model of democratic lead- 
ership, Pericles.'4 The central instances of this oppo- 
sition between Plato's politics and Thucydides' are 
five. First, in what terms should political life be 
evaluated? For Thucydides and Pericles, the key 
standards are those of greatness and splendor. 
Socrates says that the standard for evaluating regi- 
mens is set by the example of nurturing nature and 
by the image of good-not great or noble-human 
beings (238c). Second, what kind of historical self- 
understanding is appropriate for democratic Athens? 
Thucydides' Peloponnesian War is a monumental 
history in which nature and the gods play no part 
but that of resistances to be overcome' and in which 
Athens is shown creating itself through its daring in 
wars both defensive and expansionist. Socrates, by 
contrast, provides a mythic and theocentric story of 
the origin of the city and follows it with a jumbled, 
false, and largely chaotic record of recent Athenian 
wars and battles. Third, what questions should most 
concern Athenian citizens? Pericles asks his listeners 
to consider how best to maintain the collective civic 
project of dynamic Athenian rule. Socrates ignores all 
collective enterprises and instead emphasizes here, 
as in the Apology, the question of the virtue of each 
individual and the importance of caring for oneself 
and for one another. Fourth, what is the appropriate 
vocabulary of political speech? Thucydides' vocabu- 
lary is dominated by terms for greatness, glory, 
brilliance, and action. Plato in this dialogue, as else- 
where, employs prominently and with particular 
significations terms like epimeleia, therapeia, techno, 
phusis, areti, dike, and eleutheria (roughly-caretaking, 
healing, art, nature, virtue, justice, and freedom). 
Fifth, what is the appropriate tone in which to con- 
sider political matters? Pericles' tone is one of consis- 
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tent gravity and severity, and Thucydides employs 
the tragic device of juxtaposing sharply contrasting 
moments of elevation and wretchedness, as in the 
abrupt transition from Pericles' epitaphios to the ac- 
count of the plague. Plato's taste runs to a light, 
playful, frequently shifting tone. 
On my reading, then, the Menexenus hould not be 
reduced either to parody or satire on the one hand or 
to a systematic theoretical treatise or a practically 
plausible Athenian epitaphios16 on the other but 
should be understood, instead, as a playful reflection 
designed to provide a starting point for thinking 
about the kind of public speeches that ought to be 
made in democratic Athens and polities like it.17 In 
trying to assess the meaning of the Menexenus, it is 
crucial not to exaggerate some central Platonic dis- 
tinctions or tensions (e.g., philosophy/politics, my- 
thos/logos [see Phaedrus and Gorgias], and serious/ 
playful) by assuming that the weight of the dialogue 
must fall into one or another of each pair. Hence, it is 
misleading to ask whether the dialogue is on the side 
of the polis or of philosophy, serious or playful, 
expressive of Plato's serious political views or an 
attempt to subvert Athenian politics. Part of Plato's 
literary practice is to show us how the philosopher 
can also be a true politikos, how a mythos can be a 
logos, and how the complex ironies of an artfully 
written dialogue illustrate serious play. The dialogue 
can then be seen as a prime example of the kind of 
political activity indicated by the Eleatic Stranger's 
depiction of the politikos as a master weaver who 
operates behind the scenes of public life in the 
Statesman: Socrates in Menexenus is shown away from 
the public world of the agora, trying to weave to- 
gether the strands of gentleness and virility, of the 
female and foreign (Aspasia) and the male and native 
(Menexenus).'8 
THE SETTING OF THE DIALOGUE: 
CHARACTER AND CONCEALMENT 
The dramatic date of the dialogue-fixed by reference 
to events in the Corinthian War down to the Peace of 
Anatalcidas (245d6-246al) and hence immediately 
obvious to Plato's contemporaries-is at the earliest 
387 B.C. and thus years after the deaths of both 
Socrates and Aspasia. (The dating is thus even more 
anachronistic than the Gorgias.19) Plato writes a dia- 
logue that in effect identifies itself from the outset as 
a fiction, as a Platonic invention. The reader cannot 
believe even in the approximate historical accuracy of 
the dialogue; this is Socrates made young and fair 
with a vengeance.20 As for Socratic irony within the 
dialogue, the character Socrates presents the logos he 
recites-his version of that most Athenian of speech- 
es-as having been written by "Aspasia the Mile- 
sian" (249d-2), a female foreigner. Nevertheless, 
Menexenus and the readers of the dialogue cannot be 
sure whether Socrates may not have invented the 
story of Aspasia's authorship in order to conceal his 
own hand in its production. At the end of the 
dialogue, he tells Menexenus that he will be happy to 
tell him many other fine Aspasian political logoi so 
long as Menexenus swears to keep their origin a 
secret (249e3-5). 
The stress on disguise runs even deeper: the long- 
est part of Aspasia's (Socrates', Plato's) epitaphios, and 
the section in which the speech draws conclusions 
from its narrative history of Athens concerning how 
present-day Athenians ought to live their lives, is a 
prosopopoeia of the war dead (something not found 
in the other funeral orations). The central practical 
conclusions of the speech are placed in the mouths of 
the dead heroes. The dialogue thus presents itself as 
a work of manifold invention and concealment. Plato 
invents Socrates, who may or may not invent a 
speech-writing Aspasia, who in turn invents a unison 
chorus of dead Athenians. Socrates' Aspasia under- 
lines her own artful inventiveness here by saying that 
she will "say to you now both the things that I heard 
from them then and those which they would be 
pleased to speak now if it were possible, basing my 
conjecture on what they said then. But you must 
believe that you are hearing from them themselves 
the message I will give you" (246c4-8). This most 
political of Platonic dialogues is also perhaps the most 
complexly ironic; my argument here is that the pair- 
ing of political theme and ironic style is no coinci- 
dence. 
But what does this irony signify? If we rule out, as 
I think we must, treating the dialogue as either 
deflating parody or bitter satire, we are left with two 
elements crucial to Platonic/Socratic irony (crucial in 
that these are essential aspects of their practice of 
philosophy): (1) dissimulation or concealment and 
(2) ambiguity. Irony both conceals the intentions of 
the speaker and calls attention to the ever-present 
possibility of linguistic ambiguity. This style suits 
the practice of Platonic and Socratic philosophical 
politics in two ways: (1) because the work of the 
philosophical statesman is not to design institutions, 
laws, or policies but to persuade citizens of the 
primacy of the question of the good life or of human 
areti, over the questions of power, security, and 
honor; and (2) because the central business of such a 
statesman is to insist upon the unending importance 
of asking this question by refusing to give unqualified 
acceptance to any formulation or doctrine that pur- 
ports to solve it once and for all. The philosopher's 
contribution to democratic politics is to place a ques- 
tion on democracy's agenda and, through insisting 
on the essential ambiguity of language, immunizing 
democrats against accepting any rule or formulation 
as final and absolutely binding or correct. There are 
two principal rhetorical problems to be solved here by 
the philosophical politikos: one is that of finding a way 
to introduce philosophy into politics without philos- 
ophy's undergoing a corrupting transformation into 
sectarianism;2 the other is that of giving political 
advice without calling excessive attention to the phi- 
losopher's view that the philosophic life is different 
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from, and better than, the political life.22 Let us see 
how the Menexenus carries out this work. 
THE OPENING DIALOGUE (234A-236D) 
The meeting between Socrates and his well-born and 
politically ambitious young Athenian friend is pri- 
vate. Although we are not told the location of the 
dialogue, the conversation is initiated by Socrates, 
who encounters Menexenus as the latter is leaving 
the agora coming from the Bouleterion, the chamber 
housing the Council of Five Hundred,23 where that 
body is about to select a speaker to deliver the 
traditional epitaphios for the Athenian war dead.24 The 
location of the dialogue thus blurs the bright Peri- 
clean line between the private and the public worlds. 
The first words of the dialogue are Socrates' question 
"Ex agoras e pothen Menexenos?," "Do you come from 
the agora or where, Menexenus?" (Socrates being 
outside the "precinct of public life"),25 and the an- 
swer, "Yes, from the agora, from the Bouleterion, 
Socrates." We are told by Socrates that the two mean 
are quite alone and that it is only because they are 
alone that Socrates is willing to recite the epitaphios to 
Menexenus (236cll-d3). The question why Socrates 
wants to speak to Menexenus is answered in the 
exchange between the two immediately following: 
Socrates. And why especially were you at the Boulete- 
rion? Or is it clearly because you think you have got to 
the end of paideia (education) and philosophia, and think- 
ing you have grasped these things sufficiently, you are 
ready to turn your mind to greater things, to try your 
hand at ruling (archein) us older folk in spite of your age, 
o amazing man, so that your family might never fail at 
providing us with a caretaker (epimelitis)? 
Menexenus. With your permission and counsel, 
Socrates, I am eager to rule (archein); otherwise, not. 
This exchange26 establishes the dialogue as one be- 
tween a philosopher and a decent young member of 
the Athenian political class, one who assumes his 
future will be occupied with ruling, though only with 
the consent of others. Menexenus is not a future 
tyrant. Socrates does not attempt to dissuade Men- 
exenus but, rather, tries to redescribe the political life 
form its ordinary Athenian designation (archein and 
ruling) to Socrates' characteristic and different way of 
speaking about political leadership (epimeleia, the art 
of caretaking). Similar redescriptions of ruling or 
acting as caretaking or something like it form an 
important aspect of Socrates' hidden political paideia 
in several dialogues. In the Meno, for example, 
Meno's first definition of virtue is that the virtue of a 
male is "to act (prattein) on behalf of the city, acting so 
as to do well to friends and harm to enemies" 
(71el-4). Nearly two pages later, Socrates "reminds" 
Meno of his definition: "Didn't you say that the 
virtue of a male is to manage (diokein) the city well?" 
(73a6-7). Like Socrates' concealed redescription of 
praxis (action) as management in the Meno, we may 
expect that his conversation with Menexenus is 
aimed at transforming the latter's way of thinking 
about political life from a focus on maintaining a 
position of leadership in democratic Athens to a 
consideration of how properly and artfully to care for 
human beings. This expectation is fully confirmed by 
the last exhortative section of the epitaphios itself, 
which repeatedly calls on the city to exercise care 
toward all (e.g., 249c2-3) and on each Athenian 
citizen to serve and be served in turn (therapeuein te kai 
therapeuesthai, 249c5-6). To the extent that Socrates 
has gained control over the terms of Athenian polit- 
ical discourse here, the point of the epitaphios lies in its 
transformation of the political world as conceived in 
speeches from a scene of praxis and archi (rule) to one 
of therapeia nd epimeleia. 
The very end of the dialogue is a parting exchange 
in which Socrates playfully insists, and Menexenus 
accepts, the need to maintain secrecy about this 
conversation and other similar ones they may have in 
the future. (Socrates says he will tell Menexenus 
many other fine political speeches.) In the frame 
dialogue of the Menexenus (236c-d), Socrates presents 
himself as wanting to hide the epitaphios he has heard 
from Aspasia-at first because of his fear that Aspasia 
will be angry with him if she discovers he has 
revealed the speech and a moment later because he 
fears Menexenus will laugh at him, taking Socrates 
for an old man still playing like a child. Finally, 
Socrates says he will gratify Menexenus, since they 
are alone. His desire to gratify him is, he says, such 
that he might even strip naked and dance, if that is 
what it took. This figure of the teasingly reluctant 
philosopher is familiar from the Republic. The depth 
of the transformation of Athenian political self-con- 
ception Socrates aims at is both concealed and under- 
scored by his coy aloofness. The very fact that 
Socrates has no desire for political power gives his 
words a power they might otherwise lack. 
After learning that the business Menexenus ob- 
served at the Bouleterion concerns the selection of a 
citizen to give an epitaphios, Socrates' first response is 
to remark on how kalon (beautiful), in many ways, it 
is to die in battle, since no matter how worthless you 
were when alive, you are sure to get a magnificent 
send-off by speakers who, like wizards, bewitch our 
souls (235a2). Not only do these orators praise the 
Athenian dead (worthless though they may have 
been), but they praise Athens itself in every way, as 
well as the living citizens and all their ancestors. 
There is such a riot of patriotic encomium, Socrates 
says, that for more than three days (235b8-cl), he 
feels himself to have become bigger, better born, and 
more beautiful (meizdn kai gennaioteros kai kallion) than 
he was before (235b2). Greek foreigners (xenoi), who, 
Socrates says, he almost always has with him on such 
occasions, are likewise bewitched and view Socrates 
as more august (semndteros) and Athens as more 
amazing (thaumasiotera) than before (235b2-8). For as 
long as the orator's words ring in the ears of the 
audience, Athenians and Athens are puffed up in 
their own eyes and in those of the watching world.27 
"You are always making fun (prospaizeis) of the 
orators, Socrates," Menexenus responds (235c6); 
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and, of course, Socrates is playing. But the words of 
Socrates' playful speech not only ridicule the orators 
but call attention to the way his own auditors re- 
spond to Socrates, who can also be charged with 
wizardry for inducing not a feeling of puffy superior- 
ity (semnotes, 235b8)2 but a sense of bafflement (apo- 
ria). This effect of Socratic logos is noted not only by 
menacing foreigners like Meno and local enemies like 
Anytus2' but in the description of a very Socratic 
form of paideia described by the Eleatic Stranger in the 
Sophist (230e-31a). At its best, Socratic elenchos and 
aporia is designed to get interlocutors to become more 
gentle to others and more angry with themselves, 
more determined to inquire about what sort of life 
they should be leading. There is thus a direct con- 
frontation: the semnos logos (august discourse) of the 
patriotic epitaphios as depicted by Socrates removes 
the problem the aporetic logos (baffling discourse) 
seeks to make pressing. As Pericles says in his 
epitaphios in Thucydides, all that is necessary to 
achieve virtue, if you are male, is to allow yourself to 
fall in love with Athens in her imperial greatness and 
if you are female, to stay at home and out of the way 
(2.43, 51). But at the same time, the aporetic logos 
refuses to present solutions and so seems to leave its 
victims, even those who love Socrates, no choice but 
to repair to the orators-as Cleitophon repairs to 
Lysias and Thrasymachus (Cleitophon, 410c6-8). The 
introductory dialogue of the Menexenus thus sets up 
this question: Is there any way that the Socratic 
politicos can meet the political orators on their own 
ground?30 
Following Socrates in the Gorgias, we might put the 
question this way: Is there a way of speaking to the 
Athenian demos that unlike the speeches of Pericles, 
will orient individual members of the demos toward 
the question of their own virtue, of whether they are 
sufficiently just and moderate, and not toward the 
civic projects of "building harbors and dockyards and 
city walls, and of exacting tribute from subject peo- 
ples, and similar nonsense (phluaria)" (Gorgias, 519al- 
4)? The ironic epitaphios of the Menexenus is a kind of 
answer to that question. 
THE EPITAPHIOS, PART 1: THE 
GENEALOGY AND CHARACTER OF 
THE ATHENIAN POLITEIA (236D-39A) 
After acknowledging the Athenian nomos (law) that 
establishes the public funeral oration and after noting 
(except for Socrates)31 the difficulty of finding words 
adequate to memorialize deeds of such valor, the 
funeral orators all open by describing the origin and 
character of Athens. Emphases differ among the 
different speakers, but the differences between 
Socrates and Pericles are especially striking. Unlike 
other speakers, Pericles spends very little time on the 
Athenian genos, or race (Ziolkowski 1981, 75). What 
matters most to him about Athens is not the ancient 
race from which the Athenians among his audience 
are descended32 nor even the political freedom that 
the remote ancestors established but the deeds of the 
past fifty years that have founded and expanded the 
Athenian Empire (Thucydides 2.36.2). He does note 
that the same race of Athenians has lived on the same 
land of Athens, but this is only in passing and he 
draws no practical conclusions from it. 
Socrates' emphasis in his discussion of the Athe- 
nian heritage is in striking contrast to Pericles'. He 
begins by saying that in praising the war dead, we 
ought to proceed according to nature (kata phusin), 
just as the dead derived their goodness from nature 
(237a). Socrates' repeated stress on the importance of 
nature as a source of goodness (Athenians are unusu- 
ally eugeneia [of good blood] [237a6-7] and that is the 
first thing we should praise about them) and stan- 
dard of evaluation stands in sharp opposition to the 
stress on the extraordinary daring and drive of fifth- 
century Athenians displayed in Pericles' oration and 
elsewhere in Thucydides.33 Socrates' speech dwells 
on the legend of Athenian autochthony, celebrating 
the fact that Athenians, unlike other people, both 
sprung from, and were nurtured by, the land they 
live on today-Athenians are blessed by sharing both 
a fatherland and a nourishing mother earth (237c5- 
d2).34 Not only are the Athenians autochthonous, but 
Athens has been unusually beloved of the gods-so 
much so that while all the rest of the earth was full of 
wild animals, the Athenian earth alone brought forth 
only human beings and human food: wheat, barley, 
olives. Not only that, but the earth, having supplied 
material nurture for her Athenian children, finds 
them gods to educate them, "gods whose names it is 
fitting for us to omit here, for we know them, gods 
who established our way of life, in our daily regimen 
educating us in the technai first of all, and then 
concerning guarding the land teaching us how to 
acquire and use weapons" (238b2-6). 
All this ridiculously inflates the specialness of Ath- 
ens, to be sure, so that no reader could think that 
Socrates' Aspasian epitaphios aims at giving an accu- 
rate, or even a believable, history of the origins of 
Athens. But the speech does more than ridicule 
patriotic fervor. Socrates' comic genealogy makes the 
greatness of Athens depend on the good fortune of 
her natural origin and on divine favor, not on the 
special bravery of Athenian men of war. While Peri- 
cles' civic encomium says nothing about the natural 
setting of the city of Athens and nothing at all about 
the gods,35 Thucydides in his own voice speaks of the 
causes and advantages of Athenian autochthony in a 
way that is diametrically opposed to the Socratic 
account: "Attica, because of the barrenness of its 
earth, was for the most part free from stasis (civil 
strife) and therefore always inhabited by the same 
human beings" (1.2.5-6). There was nothing in the 
natural setting of barren Athens to attract invaders, 
so that the race of Athenians acquired unity because 
of the poverty, rather than bounty, of their natural 
inheritance. For Socrates, this nature represents an 
inheritance to be treasured; for Thucydides, a weak- 
ness to be overcome. The glory of Athens, for Pericles 
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and Thucydides, is in all respects strictly manmade; 
for Socrates, love of country is expressed by a playful 
gratitude to the earth and the gods. 
Born from the earth and educated by the divine 
teachers their mother chose for them, Socrates con- 
tinues, the ancestors of the war dead set up a politeia, 
which should be briefly recalled. Just as Socrates 
prefaces his story of autochthony with the statement 
that a good epitaphios must praise the dead kata 
phusin, here he begins his discussion of the Athenian 
regime with a general definition: "A politeia nourishes 
human beings (politeia gar trophy anthro-po(n esti); it is 
noble when it nourishes good humans and the re- 
verse when it nourishes wretches (kakoi)" (238cl-2). 
To show the nobility of a regime, it is necessary to 
show that it produces good human beings. Since 
Socrates has already told Menexenus that Athenian 
funeral orations praise wretches (phauloi) along with 
good men (234c), it would appear difficult to show 
this for Athens; and Socrates does not even try. 
Instead, he goes on to characterize the Athenian 
politeia as one that is called by some a democracy "but 
is in truth an aristocracy with the approval of the 
many (met'eudoxias plithous aristokratia)" (238dl-2). In 
Athens, the speech continues, political power is held 
most of the time by the people (plithos); but at times, 
the people give power and rule to those citizens who 
seem to them to be the best. In Athens, unlike other 
cities, no one is chosen for office because of his 
wealth or parentage but because he seems wise and 
good. Socrates never says here that the Athenians do, 
in fact, choose the wisest and best to rule but only 
that the regime requires elections for office, which are 
determined by the opinion of the majority, not by the 
status of the candidates. The basis for the regime of 
the best-in-the-opinion-of-the-many is located in the 
nature of Athens. All other cities are heterogeneous 
collections of all sorts of people. As a result in those 
cities, whether they are tyrannies or oligarchies, the 
citizens regard each other as slaves or masters: "But 
we regard each other as brothers born of a single 
mother, and so do not think ourselves worthy to be 
each other's slave or master, but our natural equality 
of birth makes it necessary for us to seek conventional 
legal equality (hi isogonia himas hi kata phusin isono- 
mian anagkazei zitein kata nomon)" (239al-2). 
None of this recants the often-expressed Socratic 
view that Athenian democracy generally makes 
wrong choices about who are its best citizens. In fact, 
it raises the question of whether those who have 
seemed wisest and best to the Athenians in the past 
really have been the wisest and best. Nor is Socrates' 
contention that the Athenian regime aspires to be an 
aristocracy, rather than a democracy, incompatible 
with his critique of Athenian practice elsewhere.36 
Thus, it is misleadingly simple to write off the Men- 
exenus' characterization of the Athenian politeia as 
purely pointless humor.37 Again, comparison with 
Thucydides indicates a possible context. Pericles, of 
course, does not call Athens an aristocracy; but he, 
too, says only that Athens is called by name a 
democracy, not that it is in truth one. Moreover, he 
claims that those who rank highest in the city do so 
not on the basis of wealth but on the basis of aretj 
(2.37.1). His position seems unlike Socrates' only in 
its lack of frankness in acknowledging that democ- 
racy is only a name and in his flattering (not to 
mention self-serving) endorsement of the city's judg- 
ments about the virtue of its choices. Thucydides 
comments on (and silently endorses) the lack of 
candor in Pericles' epitaphios in his praise of Pericles' 
leadership. Under Pericles' rule, he says, Athens was 
at her greatest (2.65.5); and while he ruled, Athens 
"became in speech, on the one hand, a democracy, 
but in deed, on the other, a city under the rule of its 
first man (egigneto te logo men dimokratia, ergo de hupo 
tou protou andros archj)" (2.65.9-10). Plato differs from 
Thucydides here in two major respects: (1) in setting 
forward a concept of natural fitness, rather than one 
of civic greatness, as a starting point for estimating 
the character and value of a polity38 and (2) in 
preferring a style of playful semicandor in public 
oratory to one of deceptive solemnity. 
THE EPITAPHIOS, PARTS 2 AND 3: 
ATHENIAN MILITARY HISTORY AND 
ITS LESSONS (239A-49C) 
The natural goodness of the Athenian stock having 
been stated and elaborated, Socrates' Aspasian 
speech next moves, following tradition, to present an 
account of how "our forefathers, raised in freedom, 
have shown all human beings, both in private and in 
public (kai idia kai dimosia), many and noble deeds, 
believing that it was necessary to fight for freedom 
with Greeks against Greeks and against barbarians on 
behalf of all of Hellas" (239a5-b2). This introduction 
to the recounting of Athenian military history con- 
nects that history with a perceived need to defend the 
Athenian regime. The Athenians are fighting not for 
glory but for isonomia (equity) and the right to choose 
the best and wisest among them as their leaders; 
Socrates also explicitly both recalls and effaces the 
line between public and private drawn by Pericles. 
Public deeds are due no special merit in the Socratic/ 
Aspasian account; and in the highly detailed narra- 
tive that follows, it becomes easy to see why. After 
saying that it is unnecessary to recall in bare prose 
(psiloi logoi) the mythic wars against the Amazons, 
Cadmians, and Argives, since these erga (deeds) have 
already been celebrated in poetry and music, the 
epitaphios goes on to say something about the three 
major wars of the past one hundred years-the 
Persian, the Peloponnesian, and the Corinthian-in 
prose that is very bare indeed. 
Various commentators39 have noticed that 
Socrates' history involves some systematic distor- 
tions. Some of these were not unusual for fourth- 
century Athenian patriots, such as falsely minimizing 
the contributions of any other Greek city, especially 
Sparta, to the Persian War (Thermopylae is not even 
mentioned); but others harder to explain, such as his 
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almost suggesting that Athens was allied with Sparta 
against Persia in the Corinthian War, rather than the 
other way around. There are also striking omissions, 
one particularly large: Socrates tells the history of 
fifth-century Athens without mentioning the Athe- 
nian Empire at all, let alone celebrating the daring 
exploits of Athenian adventurers, a la Thucydides. 
The speech not only relegates Salamis to second place 
in importance, behind Marathon, among the battles 
of the Persian War, but treats Salamis, along with 
Marathon, merely as indications that Greeks could 
defend themselves against Persians-leaving aside 
the extraordinary character of the sea battle at 
Salamis, stressed by Thucydides and by Lysias, 
namely, that it showed the Athenian polis to be 
entirely separate from the Athenian earth and the 
Athenian regime to be located entirely in the spirit- 
edness of Athenian citizens.40 From Plato's account, 
one would never know that the Peloponnesian War 
was in any way related to the fear of Athenian 
hegemony in Greece. The cause of the unexpectedly 
terrible character of the war, we are told, was the 
jealously of the rest of Greece (243b). 
Not only does Plato's epitaphios deflate the gran- 
deur of Athenian successes, it similarly plays down, 
in comparison with Thucydides' account, the dra- 
matic despair inherent in the defeat of the Sicilian 
expedition.4' Socrates' explanation of the collapse 
makes it appear a passing inconvenience: "Since our 
polis was blocked by distance from reinforcing the 
fleet, bad luck made them give up their plans" 
(243a3-5). The speech thus manages to convey nei- 
ther prowar nor antiwar sentiments. Bad luck and 
low motives conspired to produce undeserved de- 
feats for the Athenians; but just as victories like 
Marathon and Salamis are treated as wholly instru- 
mental to preserving freedom, rather than as memo- 
rable in themselves,42 so nothing about any of these 
defeats or sufferings in war seems memorable. Per- 
haps the clearest thing to be said about Socrates' 
Aspasian account of the rise and fall of the Athenian 
Empire is that it is an antitragic one. This can be seen 
by comparing the Menexenus on the defeat at Syra- 
cuse with Thucydides' account: "This was the great- 
est Hellenic deed (ergon) that took place during this 
war, and, in my opinion, the greatest that we have 
heard of among the Greeks-to the victors the most 
brilliant (lamprdtaton) and to the vanquished the most 
calamitous."43 From the perspective of the Menexe- 
nus, discussion of the goodness of Athens must 
concern the naturalness of its regime, not the aston- 
ishing beyond-good-and-evil greatness of its military 
exploits. The stasis that caused the final Athenian 
defeat by the Spartans is treated not as a tragic 
disintegration of civic spirit but as notable primarily 
for the gentleness and moderation shown by the 
returning democrats to their oligarchic enemies 
(something Aristotle remarks on, as well, in the 
Constitution of Athens) owing, the speech says, to their 
common membership in the autochthonous Athe- 
nian genos (244a1-3). Once the stasis was concluded, 
Athens, for what we cannot doubt are excellent 
reasons, resolves never again to fight in the cause of 
the freedom of Hellenic xenoi, either against other 
Greeks or against barbarians. Unfortunately, Sparta 
decides to take this opportunity to enslave other 
Greeks. 
The account of the ensuing Corinthian War (244d- 
46a) is similarly confused and prosaic. No pattern or 
ordered meaning arises here any more than from the 
account of the other greater wars. Everyone begs for 
Athens's help; and, being, as always, too compas- 
sionate (244e3), Athens is once again at war-with 
Sparta and in aid of Persia in spite of the fact that the 
Athenians, as unmixed Greeks, hate barbarians more 
than any other Greek does (245c6-d2). Nonetheless, 
it is Athenians who free the Persian king and drive 
the Spartans from the seas (245e-46a), bringing us to 
peace at last and to this epitaphios. Socrates' summing 
up of the deeds of Athenian men of war is as 
equivocal as the formless narrative itself: "Now many 
and noble deeds of the men lying here and of others 
who died for the city have been told, yet many more 
and nobler are those which have not been mentioned; 
for many days and nights would not be enough if one 
wanted to relate all of them" (246a5-b2). If the speech 
ended on this note, we would surely say that Socrates 
has managed to find an epitaphios logos guaranteed 
not to leave the audience feeling large and semnos for 
an instant, let alone three days. 
The particular successes and failures of Athenian 
military endeavor, shorn of greatness and brilliance, 
provide no point of reference for future action. The 
ability to make war is necessary if a city is to retain its 
freedom, and this calls for courage in the face of 
danger and difficulty; but the deeds of war have 
nothing of Thucydidean greatness about them, and 
their chronicle is thus appropriately boring and rep- 
etitious. This difference can be seen by placing side 
by side the moral lessons drawn from the erga in the 
Periclean account and that of the Menexenus: 
By giving their bodies for the common good, these men 
win for themselves praise that never ages, and the most 
significant (episimotaton) of sepulchres, not the one they 
lie in here, but that one in the opinion of men where they 
leave behind their everlasting memory, always there to 
inspire both word and deed at the critical moment. 
(Thucydides 2.43.2) 
Therefore it is necessary that every man, remembering 
these men, exhort their children, just as in wartime, not 
to leave the rank (taxis) of their ancestors, nor to yield to 
wretchedness (kakon) and make a retreat. And I myself, o 
children of these good men, I both exhort you now and 
will remind and call on you whenever I meet any of you 
in the future to be eager to be the best you can be. 
(Menexenus 246b2-c2) 
The immortality stressed in Thucydides drops out in 
Plato; and the lesson taught by the deeds of the war 
dead shifts from a standing inspiration to future 
heroism to a reminder of the importance of keeping 
your place in the hoplite phalanx and of trying at all 
times-not just in the pressure-filled kairos (critical 
moment)-to live the best life you can. 
But the speech does not end here (as several other 
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epitaphioi do) but goes on not only to console the 
audience but to advise them on how to live their 
lives. Here, Plato's aspiration to match and exceed 
the scope of Pericles' oration is evident. J. E. Ziol- 
kowski, in his survey of the funeral orations, notes 
that "the exhortation to the audience in Thucydides 
and Plato is not only longer, but also of a different 
nature from that of the other funeral speakers. The 
significant difference is that the other speakers in- 
clude no advice for future action as Thucydides and 
Plato do.... Even between the latter two there is an 
important difference: Thucydides gives directions for 
personal conduct in the present war; Plato gives 
general advice for conduct in war and peace" (1981, 
159-60). The tone of the epitaphios shifts markedly at 
246b2, 4 as the speech leaves behind the business of 
recounting the zigzag fates of war and turns to the 
task of reminding and exhorting the audience to be 
eager to excel in virtue. It is at this point that the 
concealment of the speaker's voice is extended yet 
one more stage, and Aspasia asks us to hear her voice 
as if it were the combined voice of the dead heroes. 
The prosopopoeia, unlike Pericles' speech, does not 
call on the survivors to try to match the virtue of the 
dead by an all-embracing erotic commitment to Ath- 
ens; nor does it hold out to them the promise of 
immortal life as part of the undying memory of 
Athenian greatness. Instead, the living are urged to 
do better than the dead and to do so in a truly 
extraordinary but thoroughly Platonic way-by inter- 
preting the Delphic motto Miden agan (nothing in 
excess) to mean that one's virtue depends wholly on 
oneself and that one ought to treat life and death 
lightly and moderately: 
The ancient saying Miden agan seems nobly said, and it 
truly is well said. For that man who makes everything 
that concerns his eudaimonia (happiness), or most of it, 
rest on himself and not on other human beings (so that 
his own good and bad do not perforce wander up and 
down with theirs), that man is the one best prepared to 
live; and it is he who is sophron (moderate) and manly 
and wise, it is he who while gaining or losing wealth or 
children will be especially persuaded by the proverb, 
because he neither rejoices nor mourns overmuch, since 
he trusts himself .... We ask both fathers and mothers 
to live the remainder of their lives holding to this same 
thought (dianoia), and to know that it is not by mourning 
and lamenting us that they will especially please us.... 
They would gratify us most by bearing [their sorrows] 
lightly (kouphds) and with measure metricss). (247e5-48c2) 
The epitaphios concludes with Aspasia resuming her 
own voice, asking children to listen to their dead 
fathers, and assuring parents of dead sons that the 
city will nourish their old age and care for them, 
repeating again the phrase "both in private and in 
public" (kai idia kai dimosia, 248e4), previously used to 
describe the noble deeds of Athenians (239bl). She 
ends by reminding her audience of the political 
centrality of epimeleia and therapeia (the polis appear- 
ing here in the image of Nurse, rather than, as with 
Pericles, the magically compelling Beloved). Socrates 
draws the curtain on this make-believe epitaphios by 
reminding his audience that he has been listening to 
a female foreigner: "That is the logos, o Menexenus, 
of Aspasia the Milesian" (249dl-2). Promising not to 
break confidence, Menexenus asks Socrates to tell 
him more. Promising that we have not heard the last 
word, Plato has his Socrates end the drama by 
assuring us, "Well, these things will be done." 
CONCLUSION: EARTHLY 
IMMORTALITY AND THE GOOD LIFE 
The playfulness of the written Platonic dialogue 
makes it an inappropriate vehicle for setting out 
policy proposals or even unambiguous and system- 
atic theories of government. But this does not mean 
that Plato's intervention in the political life of Athens 
is without point. In the dialogue, Plato sets in motion 
a way of talking about political life that both recalls 
and challenges Thucydidean political discourse, giv- 
ing political life a different aim and different problems 
to solve. Perhaps the clearest way of expressing the 
challenge to Periclean morality asserted by the Men- 
exenus is to say that it tries to direct attention away 
from earthly immortality and political greatness and 
toward a concern with living the life we have as well 
as possible, asking us to take our bearings in politics 
from our nature, rather than from a narrative of 
remarkable events. Part of this challenge calls for a 
revaluation of the Periclean distinction between pub- 
lic and private life, between the brilliantly noble and 
the merely good. The Menexenus may thus be said to 
carry on a project begun in the Gorgias. In that 
dialogue, Socrates comes closest to touching Callicles 
in a long speech in which he advises him not to be 
concerned with oratorical success or with not dying: 
"For anyone who is truly a man will ignore the length 
of time he will live and not set his soul's desire on 
that; but leaving all that to the god and trusting the 
women, who say that no one can flee his destiny, he 
must inquire about this thing: In what way will he 
best live whatever life he has?" (512d8-e5). Our 
worries about personal security are to be shifted not 
to an identification with sublime public greatness but 
toward inquiry concerning the good for each of us. 
But why does Socrates connect that key admoni- 
tion with the apparently superfluous remark that the 
real anir (man) will trust women and forget about 
immortality? Here we may glimpse the significance of 
Aspasia in Plato's political philosophy. The gender- 
ing of the political voice that makes the Menexenus 
such an unsettling dialogue from the outset (Why 
does Socrates say the epitaphios is Aspasia's and not 
admit to its authorship himself, as Menexenus, 
joined by generations of commentators, so clearly 
wants him to do?) derives from Plato's interest in 
bringing to light questions and issues that Pericles 
and Thucydides relegate to the silence of the private 
life and in calling our attention to the fact that this is 
precisely what he is doing. Plato's Aspasia is no more 
a woman or less a fiction than his Diotima45 (or, for 
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that matter, his Socrates); but the mask of gender, 
and the aporia such gendering may produce, is central 
to the ironical rhetoric of Plato's philosophical poli- 
tics. That rhetoric is designed not directly to replace 
how politicians speak about the world but to incline 
them toward self-critical reflection about that way of 
speaking. Socrates' place, like that of the true politicos 
described in the Statesman, is not at the front of the 
assembly or the Bouleterion but by the edge of the 
agora, weaving sense into the language of political 
deliberation. 
Notes 
A version of this paper was presented at the 1991 annual 
meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, 
Florida. For helpful comments, I thank panel organizer David 
Schaefer and fellow panelists Patrick Powers and Michael 
Zuckert. 
1. Menexenus is the agreeable and playfully eristic young 
companion of Lysis in the Lysis and is said to have been 
present at Socrates' death in the Phaedo. 
2. I will assume that Socrates refers here to the famous 
oration recorded in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War (2.35-46). 
This is the opinion of most scholars, though some have 
thought it might refer to some other Periclean oration. Several 
important parallels between the two speeches are good evi- 
dence for seeing the speech in the Menexenus as a response to 
the one in Thucydides. Kahn (1963) makes a strong case for 
this position. According to Socrates, the part of the epitaphios 
he is about to recite that was not glued together was impro- 
vised by Aspasia on the spot, with an eye to what had to be 
said. There are parallels here with Thucydides' account of 
how he composed the speeches he presents in the Peloponne- 
sian War, that is, partly from previously written sources and 
partly on the basis of what he thought appropriate (1.22). 
3. Thucydides says that his speeches aim at capturing what 
must have been said on each occasion (1.22). 
4. In the Gorgias Socrates, calling himself the true politicos, 
says that he could never make a persuasive speech in front of 
an Athenian jury (521d-22a, c). 
5. The exhortation (paramuthia) to attend to the excellence 
of one's own way of life is similar to the prodding of Socrates 
the gadfly in the Apology. As for the reference to Athens as a 
democratic aristocracy, recall that even in Republic 8, the 
democracy is said to be the one regime that contains all 
species of regimes (557d4). Moreover, the Republic, which for 
Vlastos expresses "Plato's normal view of the credo of democ- 
racy in this middle period of his life" (1973, 192), defines 
democracy as that regime in which the citizens share power 
equally and in which public offices are filled for the most part 
by lot" (8.557a2-5). But this implies that to the extent that 
offices are filled by election, rather than lot, as is the office of 
public funeral orator, the regime is not, strictly speaking, a 
democracy but moves in the direction of aristocracy. While a 
demos or plithos can never become philosophic (6.494a4), it is 
not impossible to exhort (paramuthoumenos) a plithos to be 
open to philosophy, since it, unlike the oligoi (the few), is by 
nature gentle (praon), rather than harsh (6.499d1O-500a7)- 
even if Adeimantus does not quite think so. In the Laws, the 
Athenian Stranger argues that it is easier to bring about the 
best regime from some forms of democracy than from an 
oligarchy (4.710e3-6). And in the Statesman, the Eleatic 
Stranger says that living in a lawless democracy is better than 
living in a lawless oligarchy or monarchy (303b). As Socrates 
says to his old friend in the Crito, the many are capable neither 
of great goods or great evils (44d). 
6. Dodds calls the Menexenus a satyr play appended to the 
end of the tragic Gorgias (1959, 23-24). 
7. For a survey of the controversy from antiquity to the 
present, see Clavaud 1980, 15-77. The ancient commentators 
tended to regard the dialogue as a serious epitaphios. Cicero, 
for example, says that it was recited every year at Athens 
(Orator 151). Since the eighteenth century, modern scholarly 
opinion has been largely on the side of a comic reading. There 
have, as with other perplexing dialogues, been claims that the 
dialogue must be spurious; but the ancient testimonies (in- 
cluding references to the dialogue in Aristotle's Rhetoric) make 
this way of solving the problem of reading the dialogue less 
attractive than usual. The most common way of handling the 
dialogue is to classify it as genuine but trivial. 
8. Thucydides 2.24. See also Isocrates, Panegyricus 74, writ- 
ten about 380 B.C. 
9. J. E. Ziolkowski (1981) provides a most useful catalogue 
of genre characteristics, along with some suggestive consid- 
eration of individual differences among the speeches. 
10. Nicole Loraux's 1974) is the best version of this view. 
She reads the dialogue as a countercharm designed to per- 
form a katharsis on those whose self-image has been charmed 
into passive narcissism by uncritical paeans to Athens like 
Pericles' epitaphios. The difficulty with treating the dialogue as 
sheer parody is evident in the following characterization by 
Gregory Vlastos: "And just in case we have forgotten how 
foreign to Socrates' nature is this kind of performance, almost 
his last words before beginning the speech are that he will be 
'playing' (236c) and 'dancing' (236d)" (1973, 190). But this is 
absurdly to assume that Socrates never characterizes his own 
seemingly serious speech as playful. (For an important exam- 
ple relating to the "seriousness" of his critique of democracy, 
see Republic 7.536cl-4.) It is also to forget or ignore Socrates' 
statement in Phaedrus that all written logoi are a kind of 
playing (275c). 
11. Coventry's (1989) version of this point of view is worth 
reading, as is Henderson 1975. For a less persuasive and more 
extreme version, see Stern 1974. But Coventry assumes- 
wrongly on my view-that Plato's political goal is to found a 
city like Kallipolis and that Menexenus is a bitter response to 
the failure of Athens to adopt anything like that goal. 
12. For Kahn (1963), the dialogue is an attempt to rebut 
Periclean imperialism and reorient Athenian public opinion in 
the direction of Panhellenism (a position not unlike Isocrates') 
by recalling the old days of Greeks united against Persians at 
Marathon. For Loraux (1974), Menexenus is a countercharm 
aimed at breaking the spell-binding powers of Periclean 
rhetoric and freeing Athenians from the passive narcissism 
such rhetoric induces. For Clavaud (1980), the dialogue is a 
more generalized attack on the excesses of contemporary 
Athenian rhetoric, particularly as influenced by the teaching 
of Antiphon. 
13. As for ambiguity, the speech leaves us with no clear 
precepts about the duties of citizenship and seems to baffle 
any attempt to be certain that Socrates' words are unequivo- 
cal, that they mean exactly what they say. But this feature is 
common to the whole Platonic-Socratic enterprise. For a 
strong and comprehensive argument for the essential and 
intentional ambiguity of the language of the dialogues, see 
Desjardins 1990. See the Phaedrus 276d-e on the essential 
playfulness of good written speeches. 
14. I share Peter Euben's view that Thucydides "extends 
and elaborates Periclean foresight and that his theory embod- 
ies the virtues of Periclean leadership. In this sense Thucy- 
dides' political theory is modeled on Pericles' words and 
wisdom, though the latter cannot simply be a model for it 
since one is a speaker in the assembly whereas the other is a 
writer on events that took place there" (1990, 191). Thus, 
Pericles is constrained to call Athens a democracy, while 
Thucydides can say that it was a democracy only in word, 
while in deed it was, while Pericles was general, ruled by its 
stalwart first anir (man), not by the wavering demos (2.65.9- 
10). Nothing matters more to either Pericles or Thucydides 
than civic greatness, and it was under Pericles that Athens 
was at her greatest (2.65.5). 
15. For instances of nature or human nature understood as 
a problem, rather than a solution, in Thucydides, see 3.20 
(Cleon), 3.45 (Diodotus), 3.82 and 85 (Thucydides on stasis 
[stagnation] at Corcyra), and 5.105 (the Athenians at Melos). 
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16. Whereas Isocrates' Panegyricus or Lysias' Epitaphios for 
example, could be so considered. It is similarly misleading to 
treat the Menexenus as, in effect, a "political pamphlet," as 
Kahn (1963) does. Plato's intentions and style are less straight- 
forward than those of the epitaphiast or pamphleteer, though 
Kahn is surely right to assert the importance of placing the 
dialogue in the context of political debate at Athens in the 
early fourth century. 
17. See Phaedrus 276dl-8 on the noble playfulness of the 
written speeches that the person who knows about the just, 
the good, and the beautiful sets down "as reminders for 
himself when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for 
all others who follow the same path [or track, ichnos] with 
him." Plato calls into question a number of central dichoto- 
mies: seriousness and play, philosophy and politics, logos 
and mythos. 
18. In terms of another of Socrates' self-characterizations, 
the Menexenus might be seen as a demonstration of his 
practice of the matchmaking techno (Theaetetus 149d-50a). 
19. On the confusion surrounding the dramatic date of the 
Gorgias, see Dodds 1959, 17-18. 
20. The situation here is thus quite different from that in 
the Crito, the one dialogue in which the Platonic Socrates 
presents an Athenian political speech (that of the personified 
Laws of Athens) of comparable breadth. 
21. This formulation is taken from Leo Strauss (1968, 209- 
10). In his debate with Alexandre Kojeve, Strauss says that as 
soon as the philosopher becomes more committed to a solu- 
tion than to the continual awareness and restatement of the 
fundamental problems, he ceases to be a philosopher and 
becomes a sectarian, something Socrates never did. Strauss's 
distinction between philosophers and sectarians applies with 
special force to the philosophical politics of the Menexenus. 
22. In the Philebus, there is an intriguing exchange between 
Philebus, Socrates, and young Protarchus, concerning the 
dispute between the two older men as to whether the life of 
nous, or mind, is preferable to the life of pleasure. Respond- 
ing to Socrates' praise of nous, Philebus says, "You puff up 
(semnuneis) your own god, Socrates" (28bl). After a few lines, 
Socrates asks Protarchus if he has disturbed him by "playfully 
puffing up (semmundn en t5 paidzen) nous" (28c2). Protarchus 
says that his is at a loss; and Socrates responds that "all the 
wise agree-thus puffing themselves up (heautos ontis sem- 
nunontes)-that nous is our king over heaven and earth. And 
perhaps they speak well" (28c6-8). The importance of the 
verb semnod for Socrates' critique of epitaphioi will be apparent 
in n. 28. Stanley Rosen calls attention to the importance of this 
passage (1991, 161). But Rosen radicalizes and distorts the 
passage by ignoring both Socrates' reference to play and the 
nasty edge Socrates gives to semno6 (which Rosen translates as 
"exalt"). 
23. This is the way Philip Manville characterizes the agora 
(1990, 194). Notice, however, that Socrates is very far from the 
otherworldly philosopher whom Socrates describes in the 
Theaetetus, who does not even know the way to the agora. 
24. On the council, see Ober 1989, 138-41. 
25. Thucydides remarks on the long-standing custom of 
the public epitaphios while introducing Pericles' speech (2.34), 
as does Isocrates (Panegyricus 74); and all the surviving 
speeches, including Socrates' and Pericles', open by acknowl- 
edging its traditional character. 
26. Coventry calls attention to the importance of this pas- 
sage (1989, 1-2), as does Mridier in his Bud6 edition of the 
dialogue, where he aptly comments on it as follows: "In a 
strict sense, the epimeletes were distinct from ordinary mag- 
istrates (archontes) in that they acted only on instructions given 
by the people (for example, ambassadors, customs officials, 
public works commissioners). But here, as often with Plato, 
the word is taken in a general sense" (1931, vol. 5, pt. 1, 
83-84n). 
27. Compare the bewitching effect of the speech of the 
Laws of Athens on Socrates at the end of the Crito (54d2-7). 
Both are logoi that put an effective stop to the possibility of 
any future logoi. This is emphatically not the case with the 
ironic epitaphios of the Menexenus, which not only permits, but 
demands, further commentary and interpretation. 
28. Semnos and semnotis can have a positive meaning, 
suggesting "holy, august, reversed, majestic." Context makes 
it likely that Socrates does not intend this, but we can never be 
sure. Socrates uses a related word, the verb semnod, in the 
Gorgias when describing a truly useful techno, that of the ship's 
pilot. Unlike the useless orator, the pilot does not puff himself 
up (ou semnunetai, Gorgias, 511d4) 
29. Meno 80a-b, 94e. Just as Socrates charges in the Menex- 
enus that epitaphiasts bewitch their audience into a helplessly 
semnos condition, so Meno uses the same verb (goiteuein) in 
charging Socrates with bewitching his interlocutors into help- 
less aporia (80al-4). This is what leads Loraux (1974) to see the 
Menexenus as a Platonic countercharm against the patriotic 
drug of orations like Pericles'. 
30. That the politicos could meet the orators on their own 
ground seems to be impossible, at least in a law court, 
according to the true politicos of the Gorgias 521d-22a. 
31. Ziolkowski 1981, 65. Socrates has remarked to Menex- 
enus that nothing could be easier than finding ways of praising 
Athens and Athenians before an Athenian audience (236a). 
32. Pericles says that his speech can be heard with profit by 
both Athenians and xenoi (Thucydides 2.36.4). 
33. See, e.g., the speech of the Athenians at the first 
Spartan Congress (ibid. 1.74). 
34. Autochthony and nourishment by the motherland is 
also mentioned (though with much less emphasis) later in the 
fourth century by Demosthenes (Epitaphios 5). 
35. Stories about the gods and their intervention in human 
affairs are, for Thucydides, relics of the outdated Homeric 
tradition of Greek history he hopes to supersede. Socrates' 
attitude toward divine mythology, as he explains it to young 
Phaedrus, is that since he has to spend all his time trying to 
know himself, he has no leisure left for working out secular 
explanations for events popular belief credits to the gods and 
so is perfectly willing to leave popular mythology alone 
(Phaedrus 229e-30a). 
36. See the citations collected in n. 5. Recall particularly 
that democracy for Plato is a generic type that admits of a 
greater variety of instantiations than either tyranny or oligar- 
chy and for the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, the best regime 
can more easily be achieved in transition from a relatively 
good democracy than from any sort of oligarchy. According to 
the definitions of democracy and oligarchy in Aristotle's 
Politics 3, of course, the institution of election by vote, so 
central a feature of political life in fifth and fourth century 
Athens, is an aristocratic characteristic; pure democrats 
choose their leaders by lot, oligarchs by wealth. 
37. It is likewise misleading to write it off as simple parody, 
as in Vlastos's characterization of "the primped-up Athens of 
'Aspasia's' speech" (1973, 195). 
38. Thucydides' references to nature and to human nature 
almost always suggest anticivic tendencies, rather than any 
possible basis for nomos. For example, according to Cleon, 
human beings are naturally inclined to feel contempt toward 
those who serve them, while for Diodotus, human beings 
individually and in cities are naturally inclined to injustice 
(3.39.45). The Athenians at Melos say that by nature, both 
gods and humans rule wherever they can (5.105). Thucydides 
comments on the wretchedness of unchecked human inclina- 
tions in his own voice in his discussion of the stasis at Corcyra, 
and later in the same discussion says that human phusis aims 
at overturning human nomos (3.82.84). The only reference to 
nature as providing an appropriate standard for evaluating 
conduct is in regard to women. For example, Pericles, at the 
end of his epitaphios, says that women should follow their 
nature and stay out of public life (2.45.2); and Thucydides tells 
of women taking an active part against their nature (para 
phusin) in the fighting at Corcyra (3.74.1-2). Unlike women, 
real men for Thucydides must aim at transcending and 
controlling nature. Another roughly contemporary instance 
of phusis used as a standard only for women is to be found in 
the telling of the story of the war with the Amazons in Lysias 
(Epitaphios 4). 
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39. My discussion here relies on Kahn 1963 and, esp, 
Henderson 1975. 
40. Compare Plato's brief mention of the battle of Salamis 
with the ecstatic account given by the Athenians at the first 
Spartan Congress in Thucydides 1.74, and with Lysias, Epi- 
taphios 32-46. 
41. Henderson notes this (1975, 42). 
42. Compare Lysias: "By means of many toils, shining 
contests, and most beautiful hazards, they made Greece, on 
the one hand, free, and their own fatherland, on the other, 
surpassingly great". (Epitaphios 55). 
43. Thucydides 7.87. 
44. This is noted by both Henderson (1975) and Coventry 
(1989). 
45. On the reason for inventing a woman as Socrates' 
instructor in erotics (the one art he calls his own), see 
Halperin 1990. Aspasia's role as Socrates' instructor in the art 
of political oratory reinforces, I believe, Halperin's commen- 
tary on Diotima. 
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